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ABSTRACT 
BALES,   MARY LEE.    Developmental Changes  in Mnemonic 
Organization in Children  (1975)  Pp.  71 
Directed  byi     Dr.  Mary Fulcher Geis 
The  conclusion that organization is  fundamental 
and necessary for recall performance has often been made 
by researchers who  tested adult subjects.    However, 
developmental studies  in which category clustering and 
subjective  organization were used as measures of mnemonic 
organization often failed  to support,   fully,   the  hypo- 
thesis  that recall  is dependent upon organization. 
A review of  the literature concerning childrens' 
clustering organization and subjective  organization 
indicated  that the hypothesized relationship between 
organization and recall can  be  maintained,   if traditional 
definitions  of organization are  expanded to  include 
organization criteria other than conceptual ones.    Organ- 
izational  strategies of young children were described as 
relating  to  perceptual attributes of the experimental 
items more  than to abstract  conceptual attributes  that 
have traditionally been designated as organization. 
Developmental  changes  in organization were discussed as 
evidence  for a perceptual-conceptual  continuum. 
It was  also  concluded  that current information- 
processing models  of memory,   generated  from research with 
adult subjects may be  ineffective  in accounting for 
developmental changes  in information processing in children. 
1 
The differential development of a child's ability 
to organize and his ability to apply that organization in 
a memory task for the purpose of facilitating recall was 
discussed as a possession-utilization continuum.  This 
possession-utilization continuum was contrasted with cur- 
rent arguments concerning production and mediation def- 
iciencies in children.  The possession-utilization frame- 
work was used to reconcile research results concerning 
the presence or absence of mnemonic organization in 
children. 
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CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 
Experimental   investigation  of memory can  be   traced   to 
early studies  which  were  largely concerned  with  verbal   learn- 
ing rather  than memory   (Kausler,   I07U).      Currently  a  line  of 
departure  can  be  seen  between  those  studies  primarily  con- 
cerned  with  the  active  strategies  used by  the  subject  and 
those  studies   primarily  concerned  with  the  nature   of  the   ver- 
bal material   Itself.     The  study  of memory using adult  subjects 
has   traditionally emphasized   organization   as  a  strategy  or 
process  considered  fundamental  and necessary to memory 
(Bower,   1970;   Hultsch,   1971;  Tulvlng,  1962).     From  a  tradi- 
tional point  of  view  organization may be  defined  as   a mental 
or>  cognitive  classifying scheme   Imposed   on  stimulus   Items 
for the purpose  of  facilitating  recall  of   the   items. 
Developmental  studies  of  organizational  strategies   illus- 
trate   two  major  emphases.     There  are  those   studies   In  which 
children  are used  as  an  alternative  population  to  test 
hypotheses-generated  by adult  populations—about   organiza- 
tion and   its  role   In  memory  (e.g.,  Laurence,   1966;  Mandler & 
Pearlstone,   1966;  Mandler & Stephens,   1967;   Rosner,   1^71). 
In   addition,   there  are  those  studies  primarily   interested   in 
memory as   It  appears   in  children   (e.g.,   Bousfleld,   Esterson,  & 
White,   1958;   Cole,  Prankel,  & Sharp,   1971;   Denney &  Zlobrowskl 
1972; Kobaslgawa,  1974; Kobaslgawa & Mlddleton,  1972;  Lange, 
1973;  Lange & Jackson,   1974; Neimark, Slotnlck, & Ulrlch,   1971| 
Nelson,   1969;  Rltter, Kaprove,  Pitch, & Flavell,   1973;  Worden, 
1974)•     The former emphasized characteristics  of memory and 
organization while the latter emphasized characteristics of 
children. 
This  paper will  focus  on   the  development   of mnemonic  or- 
ganization   in   children  as  a prototype  of  cognitive  development. 
This  parallel  relationship between  the  development  of memory 
and  the  development  of  cognition  was  suggested  by Flavell 
(1971)  and Corslnl   (1971).     The position will be taken   that 
current  models   of memory  originally generated  by adult   studies 
are   Ineffective   in  accounting for  developmental  changes   in  the 
form of  organization  and   its role   in memory.     Traditional  con- 
ceptualizations   of  organization need  to be  expanded  or modi- 
fied  to account for the  variations   in cognitive activity which 
occur   in  children  with   Increasing age.     The  term organization 
will be used here  to  include age-related  qualitative  differ- 
ences   in cognitive activity.    Developmental changes   In organi- 
zation will be discussed   in terms  of a perceptual-conceptual 
continuum.     A  possession-utilization continuum will be used   In 
an attempt to explain the presence,  absence,   or emergence of 
age-related   organization  schemes   In  children.     This   continuum- 
constructed  from notions  put  forth by Moely,   Olson,   Halwes,   and 
Flavell   (1969)   and Lange   (1973)—Li   an  attempt   to reconcile  the 
production  deficiency  (Flavell,   Beach,  & Chinsky,  1^66)   versus 
mediation  deficiency argument   (Reese,   1962)   In developmental 
terms,   rather  than  viewing  these  as  either/or  propositions. 
The  production-mediation  argument  will be  explained  at  a 
later point  but   Is  not   central   to  the  focus  of  the  paper. 
The  possession-utilization continuum as  a  developmental 
phenomenon  seems   to  explain  the  well-documented   finding   that 
children  possess   the  ability  to  organize  before   they are  able 
to  apply  that   ability  to  a memory  task  for  the ournose  of  In- 
creasing  recall. 
CHAPTER   II 
MODELS  OP MEMORY:  AN OVERVIEW 
S-R  versus   Information  processing.      Since  the  act  of re- 
membering   Is  an unobservable  event,   It  readily lends   itself 
to a variety of theoretical models   (Kausler,  I97I4.).     Current 
Information-processing models  of  memory have  been  proposed   to 
more  closely approximate  the  active role  played  by the  subject 
in  determining what   will be  remembered  and how   It  will be  re- 
membered.     In  contrast,   earlier stimulus-response models  as- 
sumed  the  subject  to be  a passive  recipient  of  environmental 
events.     According  to  the stimulus-response models,  memory  de- 
pended  on the strength of the bond or association occurring at 
the time  of stimulus presentation.    This  strength could be 
altered by the amount  of delay and  Interference between study 
and recall or by the availability of an association with an 
Item previously stored.     Since S-R models   were formulated be- 
fore   Information-processing models,   It   Is  not  surprising  that 
they were  more  specifically  related  to  verbal learning 
phenomena. 
Information-processing models  are  broader   in  scope not 
only  in   terms   of  the  subject's  role but  also   In   terms  of  the 
nature  of  the stimulus materials.     Information-processing 
models   attempt   to  encompass  processes  of  attention  as well  as 
of memory and are not limited   to the processing of verbal 
material  (Kausler,  197^)-     Information-processing models, 
analogous to computer operation, are generally pLctured as flow 
diagrams of bins and channels which attempt to account for both 
storage and retrieval of Information. Organization Is thought 
to represent either a storage mechanism or a retrieval mechanism 
or both.  The distribution of Information from one bin to 
another and the choice of mnemonic strategy, I.e., rehearsal or 
organization, are left up to the subject. 
It should be noted that models of memory were originally 
constructed to account for adult memory.  Developmental con- 
siderations raise a question regarding the appropriateness of 
the passive, S-R and active, Informat lon-orocess Lnp; models of 
memory.  Some Investigators (Flavell, Friedriehs, & Hoyt, 1^70) 
have suggested that the ability to actively process Information 
appears only In older children when they begin to use more 
adult-like strategies.  If this Is true, models which view the 
Individual in a more passive role may prove more appropriate 
to explain memory In younger children.  However, It seems rather 
awkward to propose one model of memory to account for mnemonic 
strategies of young children and a different model for older 
children and adults. 
The role of rehearsal.  information-processing models of 
memory are concerned with both the storage of Information In 
memory and the retrieval of Information from memory.  A major 
part of early Investigations dealt with rehearsal as a storage 
mechanism.  Evidence for rehearsal, I.e., repetitive verbaliza- 
tion of an Item, as a strategy for remembering Is sunnlled by 
behavioral observation and verbal report.     The aerial-recall 
task has  traditionally been  the  paradigm of  choice  for studying 
rehearsal  strategies   In both children  and  adults   (Hagen,   1971; 
Klngsley & Hagen,   1969).     In  this  task,   the   subject   Is  given  a 
series  of  words,   objects,   or pictures  to  study for a  short  per- 
iod  and   Is   then  asked   to  recall  the   Items   In   the  sane  order  as 
they were  presented.     If  the  probability of  recall  of  each   Item 
Is   plotted  as   a  function  of   Its  position  of  presentation   in   the 
series,   a U-shaped   curve   Is  generated,   Indicating  that more 
Items  are  recalled   from   the beginning and  end   of   the  list   than 
from  the middle. 
This  classic  serial-position  curve whose   left  side  repre- 
sents the   Items recalled  from the first part  of the list 
(primacy effect)  and whose right side represents the   Items re- 
called from  the  end   of   the  list   (recency  effect)   Is   tradition- 
ally accepted,   In  an   Information-processing model,   as   evidence 
for  different  processing  stations being activated  during a mem- 
ory   task.     For  those  who   emohaslze  the  storage   component   of  the 
Information-processing model   (Atkinson & Shlffrln,   1968),   the 
two  extremes  of   the   serial-recall  curve are believed   to repre- 
sent   output  from long-term and   short-term memory.     Rehearsal   Is 
thought   to  account   for the primacy effect  by  transferring   Items 
to  or by maintaining   Items   In  long-term memory.     On  the  other 
hand,   short-term memory needs  no active maintenance due   to   the 
short   time   Interval   just  prior  to  recall,   and   the recency 
effect  is produced by the subject's merely "dumping out"   the 
last few Ltems In recall.  As a subject repeats a series of 
Items over and over In his effort to "learn" or "remember" 
them, the first Items Dresented In the series will be rehearsed 
more times than Items presented later In the series.  This re- 
hearsal results In Increased recall for early Items, I.e., the 
primacy effect.  Since the latter Items In the list would not 
have had this opportunity to be rehearsed, some other mechanism 
Is needed to account for the Increased recall of the latter 
Items.  A short-term memory system with Its "dumping" mechanism 
has gone essentially unchallenged as the underlying mechanism 
responsible for the recency effect.  For Investigators emphasiz- 
ing retrieval components of the memory system (Tulvlng, 1962), 
rehearsal plays a differential retrieval role rather than a 
differential storage role. 
Rehearsal occurs spontaneously In older children and 
adults but falls to occur spontaneously In young children 
(Hapen, 1Q71; Klngsley & Hagen, 1969).  However, If young 
children are forced to rehearse In an experimental task, their 
recall Is better than that of children who do not rehearse 
(Klngsley & Hagen, 196°).  These results emphasize the Impor- 
tance of rehearsal In memory of children, and similar results 
have been found In studies in which children have been forced 
to use organization as a memory plan.  The latter results will 
be discussed Ln greater detail Ln subsequent sections of this 
paper. 
Storage and  retrieval  In children.    Although storage and 
retrieval roles  of organization  In children have been dealt 
with experimentally In either an   Implied  (Moely et al.   1969) 
or a direct manner (KobosIgawa,  197^» Worden,  1974),   the as- 
sumptions are often geared more toward adult model testing 
than they are toward developmental parsimony.    Short-term and 
long-term storage models seem to require that mnemonic schemes 
for auditory and  visual material may be different for children 
and adults   (Hasher & Clifton,  1971+) •     This would seem to require 
that short-term and  long-term storage play one role for children 
and another for adults.    Cralk and Lockhart's  (1972)   "levels  of 
processing"   conceptualization of memory  Is more concerned with 
processing activity   itself rather than the filing system and, 
so,   seems more developmentally  interpretable.    However,   current 
research  is generally attuned to   ideas  of storage and retrieval 
In children   (Kobasigawa & Orr,  1973; Hitter, Kaprove,  Pitch,  & 
Flavell,   1973). 
If  It Is reasonable to conceptualize memory  In  terms of 
computer models,   It might be assumed that only what   Is pro- 
grammed   In can be retrieved.     It   Is often assumed  that from 
this point of view,   organization would play a greater role dur- 
ing the storage process than during the retrieval process. 
Attempts   to examine the focus of the effects  of organization 
on memory can be divided  Into two types:     (a)  those which 
examine the effects  of organization on storage by manipulating 
study conditions while recall  (retrieval)   conditions  are held 
constant;   and,   (b)   those which examine the effects  of 
organization on retrieval by holding study (storage) factors 
constant and manipulating recall conditions.  It is generally 
assumed, however, that mere provision of certain study condi- 
tions insures that the information will be stored just as it 
is presented by the experimenter. However, this assumption 
might not always be valid In the case of children.  If these 
conditions can be assumed to reflect the use of organization 
during storage, then the experimenter's task is to see under 
what conditions information will be retrieved. 
Kobaslgawa (197l\.)  provided carefully controlled conditions 
to first-, third-, and sixth-grade children and varied retrieval 
conditions to test for the development of effective use of re- 
trieval cues. He compared retention for conditions of free 
recall, cued recall, and directed cued recall.  In the cued 
condition, children were provided during recall with a deck of 
cards that had previously been paired with the study Items. 
If It occurred to the child to look at the cards (he had been 
told that he might look), each picture should assist In the re- 
call of the three items with which it had been paired during 
study. In the directive cue condition, the child was explicitly 
told that each card was related to three items that he had 
studied.  There was no difference between the free recall and 
cued recall of first and third graders, although the third 
graders made greater spontaneous use of the retrieval cues. 
On the other hand, directed cuing greatly improved recall for 
first and third graders. Sixth graders used the cues In a more 
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systematic manner than did the third graders who used them. 
For the sixth graders, the directed cue condition did not pro- 
duce recall effects greater than those achieved In the cue con- 
dition, but retention with either type of cuing was superior to 
retention under the free recall condition.  In conclusion, 
Kobaslgawa stated that "the similarity In recall scores across 
the three age groups under the directive cue condition appears 
to indicate that the highly similar amount of Information was 
available In storage at all grade levels." (p. 133).  If this 
can be assumed, then the present data for the free recall con- 
dition (younger subjects recalled less than older subjects) may 
be considered as evidence for the hypothesis that younger sub- 
jects seem to have greater difficulty than older subjects in 
retrieving Information from storage. 
It seems unnecessary to assume that the Information was 
stored merely because It was provided by the experimenter In 
the study condition.  If age-related differences In retrieval 
could be explained on the basis of incomplete storage during 
study, it Is not surprising that younger children required 
stronger or directive cuing to recall Information. A milder 
cue would be expected to be Ineffective under conditions where 
storage was Incomplete. Since use of the milder cue was, In 
addition, optional rather than forced, It Is not surprising 
that younger children failed to use It spontaneously. Those 
younger children who did refer to picture cues In a spontaneous 
manner were reported to use them In a rote fashion.  In other 
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words,  each cue seemed  to facilitate the recall of only one 
Item rather than facilitating the recall of the organization 
which,   in  turn,   should  assist  recall  of  several  Items.     This 
non-strategic use of the cues suggests an effective  threshold 
had not been reached which would   Insure appropriate cue utili- 
zation for the purpose of recalling the  Items studied. 
Kobaslgawa Interpreted the younger children's lack of 
spontaneous and effective use of the cues  In terms of an  In- 
ability to simultaneously focus attention on three different 
parts of the retrieval process:     (a) recall the study item; 
(b)  look at  the cue;  and   (c) maintain these actions  long enough 
to retrieve one   Item per cue.     If the attentlonal processes are 
Incapable of   Integrating these actions during retrieval,   It 
would  seem unreasonable to assume they would have been effective 
In processing the  Information during study.    The storage task, 
as structured by Kobaslgawa,   likewise Involved several steps. 
Worden   (I97I4.) made a strong argument for the  Importance 
of organization at  storage.     She required first,   third, and 
sixth graders  to sort pictures   Into either two or six cate- 
gories prior to recall.    All subjects sorted correctly under 
these conditions, and there were no differences   In retention 
under any of the retrieval conditions — no cues,  category 
labels as cues,  and blocked recall.     In blocked recall,   the 
experimenter gives a category label, and the subject recalls 
as many study items  as possible belonging to that category. 
This procedure then   Is  followed for each category that was 
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present  In  the list.     Worden's conclusion was  that,   once organ- 
ization was stable,  additional organization  that was  provided 
at retrieval had no effect. 
Lange (1973)  compared the recall and  clustering of kinder- 
garten,  fifth-grade,  and ninth-grade children  In a free recall 
condition and two cued conditions.     The stimulus  Items were 
pictures that could be categorized as food,   clothing,   furniture, 
and animals.     In one cued condition,  category labels were pre- 
sented during study,   and the children pointed to the appropriate 
Instances of each label.     In the other condition,  category cues 
and pointing procedures were repeated; but,   in addition,   cate- 
gory cues were provided during recall as  subjects recalled  the 
Items   In blocked sequence.     The eue-at-study condition did not 
produce better recall than the free-condition   Ln which cues 
were not provided.     It  can be assumed that the category label 
in the study-cue condition either did not provide sufficiently 
strong Inducement to get the children to utilize category or- 
ganization at storage or, alternatively,   the children used 
category organization but retrieval was faulty.    The fact that 
blocked recall was better than free recall lends some support 
to a retrieval deficiency argument.    The question then arises, 
as to whether the retrieval cuing Is,   ln fact, providing the 
organization at retrieval rather than merely making storage 
organization operative. 
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CHAPTER   III 
DEFINITIONS  AND METHODOLOGY 
What   Is organization?    Organization does not have a direct, 
overt  behavioral  component.     It   Is  mental  activity  that  must be 
operationally defined   If   It   Is  to be  studied.     There  are   increas- 
ing attempts to   Include overt behavioral data,   e.g.,  naming, 
pointing to   Item,   self-testing,   In  studies   designed   to  test  or- 
ganization, but the functional significance of such behaviors 
for memory performance has not been dealt with beyond a simple 
description of them (Appel,  Cooper, McCarrell,  Slms-Knlght, Yussen, 
& Plavell,   1972; Plavell et al.,  1970; Moely et al.,   19^9; Yussen, 
Gagne,  Garglulo, & Kunen,   197^4-) •     Organization,   as originally 
defined   In  adult  studies   (Bousfleld,   1958;   Tulvlng,   1962),   Im- 
plies   a rather high  level   of  conceptual mental  activity  that may 
be beyond  the  developmental abilities   of young children.     Devel- 
opmental  data may require  some modification   of  the  way   In  which 
organization   Is  conceptualized,   In   order  to  account  for 
children's  apparent  cognitive  activity which  occurs  above  the 
level   of rote recall  and  below the  supraordlnate  conceptualiza- 
tion  found   in  adults.     These modifications may need  only  to 
broaden the scope of the definition  of organization to account 
for qualitative  differences   In  organization.     Presently used 
quantitative measures may continue to be appropriately applied 
to qualitatively different dimensions of organization.     For ex- 
ample,   measures   of clustering organization   (to be   Indicated 
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subsequently) might just as appropriately quantify develop- 
mentally primitive modes of organization as discussed In this 
paper.  Traditionally, however, these primitive mnemonic schemes 
are not defined as organization. 
Organization is said to occur when a subject manipulates 
stimuli or stimulus events according to a rule or dimension 
not present in the actual items themselves.  The subject im- 
poses upon groups of items some sort of cohesiveness generated 
from his past experience or contrived meaning.  For example, 
If a subject is given the words box, light, and room, in a long 
list of other Items, he might think to himself, "Turn the light 
on in the room and look for the box." This is an example of 
Idiosyncratic organization whose rationale would be difficult 
to test except by verbal report. Nevertheless, it would be 
credited as organization in a free-recall situation, If those 
three words appeared together in the subject's recall protocol 
In spite of the fact that they had never appeared together on 
any trial of the free-recall task. 
The preferred paradigm for the study of organization has 
been that of free recall.  The subject is presented a list of 
items for study and is later asked to recall them in any order 
that he chooses.  The objective is to allow the subject as much 
freedom as possible in determining order of recall. 
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Experimenter-defined organization.     Free recall studies  of 
organization fall  Into two general categories  of experimenter- 
defined  organization and subject-defined organization.     In 
experimenter-defined organization,   the experimenter selects 
the stimulus   Items  according to some criterion of meaning which 
which   Is  not  physically apparent   In  the  stimuli   themselves. 
The objective   la  to observe whether or not subjects organize the 
material  on  the  basis  of  the relationships   Intentionally pro- 
vided by the experimenter.     The task for the subject   Is to detect 
this organizational option and  to use  It   In his  recall.     Classic 
examples   of quantifying the amount  of experimenter-defined  or- 
ganization that   Is present   In a subject's recall protocol are 
category-clustering measures originally designed by Bousfleld 
(1953).     Comparison and  contrast of the various quantifying 
techniques are beyond the scope  of this paper. 
Category clustering  Is an example of higher-order, 
conceptual organization since the Items in the list are represen- 
tatives of the categories.    An experimenter might compose a list 
of the following  Items:     foble. boaf;.   carrp.t,   1?raln,  bean, 
cabinet,   tomato,   car,  bed.     The order of presentation  of these 
Items   Is randomly varied for each trial.    After each presenta- 
tion  trial,   the subject   Is asked to recall the  Items   In any 
order.     If the subject,   In spite of the changes  In presentation 
order,  persists  on each trial to group the order of his recall 
in terms of the taxonomic categories of vehicles,   furniture, 
and food,   category clustering  Is  said  to have occurred. 
16 
If, on the other hand, the subject's order of recall persisted 
In the form of table, train, tomato, car, cabinet, carrot, bed, 
bean, boat, clustering would still be present.  However, the 
level of organization would not be as conceptually elaborate 
or abstract.  In the latter case, the subject's output is ap- 
parently organized on the basis of beginning letter (or sound 
If presented auditorily)which Is a perceptual characteristic 
of the Item.  In the latter example, the subject Ignored or 
failed to detect the categorical potential of the Items and 
responded on the basis of a characteristic Inherent In the 
stimulus Items: beginning consonant. This example Illustrates 
the fact that a subject often selects alternate choices of or- 
ganization modes, even when care Is taken to control for these 
variables.  It should be noted that the perceptual-conceptual 
developmental continuum Is prevalent In developmental research. 
Young children would be expected to group or classify Items 
on the basis of perceptually concrete characteristics that are 
more directly related to the stimulus Items rather than to 
group on the basis of more abstract relationships of meaning 
provided by the experimenter. This point will be treated more 
extensively In a later discussion of the presence of organiza- 
tion In children. 
In subject-defined organization studies, the objective Is 
to measure the extent to which a subject spontaneously Imposes 
his own organization on the material that the experimenter has 
judged to be unrelated.  In a multltrlal free-recall paradigm, 
17 
originally posed by Tulvlng (1962),   the subject studies a list 
of Items  that are presented   In a different order on each trial. 
Organization  Is  said to occur when the subject recalls  the 
Items   In a consistent  order  that   Is   Independent of the order 
In which the  Items were presented for study.     The consistent 
output  order of groups  of Items   Is called  clustering and   Is ac- 
cepted  as  evidence   for  subjective  organization.     The  assumption 
Is that  the persistent groups of  Items appearing  In recall bear 
some sort of relatedness to  the subject, but  the nature of the 
relationship   Is probably unknown to the experimenter.    However, 
If one considers the  Idiosyncratic relationships that a subject 
might   Impose on any group of   items,   there  is   in reality no such 
thing as a truly unrelated list.     The  term unrelated  Is used 
from the experimenter's point  of view to suggest that he has 
eliminated any obvious relationships among  items (Tulvlng,  1962). 
In  the case  of experimenter-defined,   category clustering the 
fact   that   the  experimenter can make  a  statement  about   the 
qualitative nature of the organization  relative to the potential 
Included   In  the  list   Is   Incidental   to measuring  the  amount  of 
clustering  and   Its  relationship  to  the  amount  of  Information 
recalled.     The measure of subjective organization does not make 
even an  Incidental attempt to   Identify the basis of the organi- 
zation used   In the subject's recall,  although the nature  of the 
subjective  organization could probably be determined  from the 
subject's protocol. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
SPECIAL  DEVELOPMENTAL   CONSIDERATIONS 
Before  the  development  of organization   In  children  and 
Its  role   In memory are  discussed,   it   is   important  to note  two 
developmental  considerations  that repeatedly make their ap- 
pearance   in studies   Involving children as  subjects.     Both pose 
methodological obstacles that are perhaps not  too persistent 
In adult  studies. 
Awareness   of task demands.     The first consideration  in- 
volves  young children's   awareness   of  task  demands  and  the 
state   of  task readiness   which  they bring  to  an  experimental 
situation.     Several   Investigators  have  stressed  the  point  that 
young  children are not particularly "efficient"  or "planful" 
in  their approach  to memory tasks   and  are generally unaware 
that   the  task  requires  some goal-directed  activity  to   insure 
retention   (Appel  et  al.    (1972);  Plavell  et  al.,   1°70;  Nelmark 
et al.,  1970; Yussen  et al.,  197U)• 
Appel et al.   (1972)   suggested  that young children recall 
less   information  than   older children  because   the  ability  to 
perceive and the ability to memorize have not been differen- 
tiated   in the young child.    The authors predicted that young 
children would not show better recall when   Instructed 
to remember the   items  than when  instructed to look at  the  items. 
To test this prediction,   they gave  one group of children com- 
posed   of preschoolers,   first graders,   and  fifth graders   In- 
structions   to  look at   the  pictures   carefully for  the  Purpose  of 
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performing a non-recall task.     The other group of children 
from the  same grades were given instructions  to remember the 
names  of  the pictures.     Preschool children and first graders 
confirmed  the differentiation hypothesis,   since  they showed 
the same level of recall for both instructional conditions 
when the pictures were presented  in a simultaneous array. 
When  the picture   items were presented  in successive order, 
preschoolers continued to show no differences   in recall be- 
tween the  two  Instructional  conditions.    However,  with suc- 
cessive presentation,  first graders recalled more   items with 
memory   Instructions   than  with  look   instructions.     Fifth graders 
demonstrated better recall with Instructions  to remember than 
when  they were merely Instructed to look at  the pictures,   re- 
gardless   of  whether  items  were  presented  successively or 
simultaneously.     This latter finding suggests that the differ- 
entiation  between  perception  and memory was  well  established 
by about 10 years of age. 
To   investigate further the apparent discrepancies   in the 
data of the first graders,  Yussen et al.   (197*1-)   tested the 
same   instructions and used the same picture stimuli.     The pic- 
tures  were  simultaneously presented to groups  of first,  second, 
third,   fourth,  and fifth graders.    The  subjects at all ages 
recalled more  items when they were Instructed  to remember than 
when  they were merely Instructed tjQ look, at  the pictures.     The 
combined results  of these two studies suggest  that  even first 
graders are aware  that some active process   Is necessary to 
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facilitate recall when they know they will later be asked to 
recall   the   Ltem3.      It   Is  unclear why first  graders  yielded 
different results under conditions of simultaneous and succes- 
sive presentation of the picture  Items.     Procedural differences 
might provide an explanation.     The former Investigators reported 
the use of a "foil task"  which was presented to the subjects   In 
the look condition  to facilitate attendance to the task.     The 
latter authors did not report   the use of such a task.     If sub- 
jects   In the Yussen et al.   (197i+)   study failed  to attend to all 
of the  Items   In the look condition,  and/or If  Instructions  to 
remember facilitated  their attention  In light of their ability 
to differentiate,   better recall under   Instructions   to remember 
would not  be  surprising. 
In addition,  behavioral data  In the Yussen et al.   (197*4-) 
study—If  they represent  even  a gross  developmental  sequence-- 
Indlcate  that the children   In  the second  study may have been 
more advanced   or more  homogeneous  or both.     In  the  second   exper- 
iment,  fewer first-grade children relied  on sequential naming 
than In the first experiment,  and more first graders  In the 
second experiment demonstrated active categorizing by picture 
rearrangement.     This sequence assumes  that naming Is develop- 
mentally more primitive than categorizing.    If Yussen et al.'a 
first graders were more advanced,  as suggested by the behavioral 
data,   then differentiation between perceiving and memorizing 
would be more complete, and recall would be greater with  In- 
structions  to remember even   In chronologically younger first 
21 
graders.     This explanation la consistent with the results of the 
study by Yussen et al.   (197lj.).     The behaviors  of sequential nam- 
ing,  sequential pointing,  rehearsal,  and rearranging pictures 
by categories are assumed by the authors to reflect a general 
Increase  In active, planful  Involvement  In the   task.    Sequential 
naming was the behavior most often observed at   the preschool 
level and was  observed  just as  often In the look condition as 
the memory condition.    This outcome suggests that   Instructions 
to remember made  preschoolers  no more  goal  directed   than   In- 
structions   to  look.     Since  recall did  not  differ between   these 
two  conditions,   even   In  the  presence  of  sequential naming,   the 
authors  concluded   that this particular study behavior was not 
the  result  of  a deliberate,   Intentional  strategy but  was  merely 
naming for the sake of naming.     Pointing,  rehearsal,  and picture 
rearranging, however, were observed to a greater extent   In the 
older children and are assumed to be manifestations  of cognitive 
activity applied to the task for the purpose of   Increasing re- 
call  In the memory condition. 
Nelmark et al.   (1971)   similarly reported behavioral evi- 
dence that suggested deliberate memorizing strategies were 
present   In first graders but that these behaviors might not 
have reflected  the subject's actual awareness  of  task demands. 
In summarizing the nature of responses for first  graders, 
these authors stated,   "After scanning each of the   Items   In 
turn,  he  thinks he   "has them'; a number of the younger children 
announced  that they were ready before the end  of   the three 
22 
minute study period Interval.  On recall they appeared sur- 
prised at the paucity of their output and scanned the testing 
room for associative cues to trigger remaining Items.  (p. I4.3U, 
As In the previous study, overt behavior of young children In 
the Nelmark et al. (1971) study did not necessarily reflect 
cognitive awareness of task demands. This description of the 
first graders' performance also reflects young children's In- 
ability to predict their own readiness to recall Items In a 
memory task. 
Flavell et al. (1970) dealt more directly with the Issue 
of young children's awareness of task demands. They asked 
children from nursery school, kindergarten, and second and 
fourth grade to predict their own Immediate memory span.  In 
addition, the children were asked to estimate their readiness 
to recall a series of Items that was equal In length to their 
actual Individual memory span.  To determine the child's pre- 
dicted memory span, each child was shown a series of first one 
Item, then two items, and so forth to ten Items.  After each 
3erles of a different length, the subject merely responded If 
he thought he could remember the names on n_ Items If the ex- 
perimenter covered them. Each subject's actual memory span 
was tested by having the experimenter call out varied list 
lengths of familiar Items and asking the subject to recall 
them In the order they were presented. Actual span was de- 
fined as the longest list the subject could recall correctly. 
In a final task, each child was asked to estimate his 
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readiness  to recall Information after an untLraed study period. 
After being acquainted with the mechanics  of an apparatus 
which permitted the child to expose pictures one at a time, 
the subject was  told to study each item In a series as long 
as he wished and to signal the experimenter when ready to 
recall. 
Flavell et al.   reported that  the children's approach to 
the task became more "responsive" and  "realistic" with Increas- 
ing age and that accuracy of prediction of memory span and of 
recall readiness  increased with age.    However,   the abilities 
of predicting memory span and predicting recall readiness ap- 
parently operated somewhat   Independently,  since   the best per- 
formers  In each condition were not necessarily the same sub- 
jects.     It   Is   interesting  to note  that prediction of memory 
span was performed through visually presented material, but 
actual memory span was measured by auditory presentation of 
verbal material.     If actual and predicted memory spans had been 
measured within the same sensory channel using similar material, 
the age-related differences between the two may have been small- 
er for all ages.     In addition,   If visual processing Is more ef- 
ficient  than auditory processing In children as young as 
nursery school and kindergarten age, auditory processing seems 
an unfair test of actual memory span when the predicted span 
was  obtained from visual processing.     This  confounding may even 
be   Independent  of the developmental advantage of pictures over 
verbal material  in young children   (Cole,  Frankel, & Sharp,   1971). 
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In summary,   It  Is apparent from the preceding studies that 
any Interpretation of results concerning organization  In 
children's memory must take  Into account  the child's ability to 
attend to and  to understand relevant task demands.     Such task 
awareness must occur before appropriate processing strategies 
can be selected by the child  If,   In fact, more than one strate- 
gy Is available to young children. 
Possession versus utilization.    The second   Important de- 
velopmental consideration affecting the presence or absence of 
a given organizational strategy Involves  the possession versus 
utilization phenomenon.     This phenomenon has   Its  foundations 
In the production-deficiency versus mediation-deficiency argu- 
ment which reappears from time to time  In the literature 
(Moely et al., 1969;  Reese,   1962).    Kendler, Kendler,  and Wells 
(I960) noted,   "There  Is a stage  In human development   In which 
verbal responses,   though available,  do not readily mediate be- 
tween external stimuli and overt responses   (p.   87)."    Refer- 
ring to this conclusion,  Reese (1962) used the term medlatlonal 
deficiency.    A mediation deficiency  Is said to exist when a sub- 
ject possesses an ability or a skill which should facilitate re- 
call   If   It   Is brought  Into use during a task.     However,   for some 
reason,   the ability,   when used, falls to produce  the expected 
facilitation.     Plavell, Beach,  and Chlnsky  (1966)  reconceptual- 
Ized the notion by considering the phenomenon to be a produc- 
tion deficiency rather than a mediation deficiency.    They 
reasoned  that,  even though children possess a certain amount  of 
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verbal facllLty,   they faLl to produce  it  In a task-appropriate 
manner.     Thus,   a production deficiency Is said to occur when a 
subject possesses a skill but does not spontaneously bring  It 
forth for the specific purpose of task performance,  even though 
better performance could be guaranteed   If the skill were used. 
If verbalization—an overt behavior assumed  to reflect media- 
tion-- Is  Induced,   the expected medlatlonal value   Is apparent  In 
Increased recall.    Lange  (1973)  perhaps offered a more accurate 
description  In  the term utilization deficiency.     In other words, 
a child may possess some ability,   such as  the ability to organ- 
ize  information, but for some reason falls to utilize  It  spon- 
taneously In a memory task.     This  concept allows for both a 
production deficit and a mediation deficit to occur at differ- 
ent points  In development.     It might also reflect different 
points  on the task acquisition—task performance continuum 
(Moely et al.f   1969).     In this case a subject may fall to util- 
ize a strategy effectively while acquiring knowledge of a task. 
As familiarity with the task Increases, utilization will be 
more apt to appear. 
Moely et  al.   (1969)   designed an experiment to evaluate the 
relative merits  of the mediation deficiency and production de- 
ficiency hypothesis.     Nevertheless,   they concluded  with an 
allusion   to  the   same  "point   In  development"  descrLbed  by 
Kendler et al.   (I960) by stating,   "It  Is possible that when a 
symbolic  operation  Is very newly acquired,  one might for a 
time also find some genuine mediation deficiency"   (p.   32). 
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The major results of this study were Interpreted In favor of 
a production deficiency since first, third, and fifth grade 
subjects Increased their recall after being Induced via a 
training procedure to use category organization. Trained sub- 
jects1 recall reflected the use of category clustering, and 
their recall was greater than that of untrained subjects. 
Although the untrained subjects did not exhibit category 
clustering In their recall, they were able to sort the pic- 
tured Items by their respective taxonomlc categories during a 
post-experimental sorting task. In effect, even the untrained 
subjects possessed the ability to categorize the experimental 
material although they did not spontaneously utilize this 
ability for the purpose of assisting their recall. Trained sub- 
jects who did utilize the organizational strategy demonstrated 
superior recall—a finding which suggests that, If the untrained 
subjects had used the organizational, their recall would like- 
wise have Increased. 
Moely et al. (1969) suggested an Interesting possibility 
as to why young children fall to utilize a skill they obviously 
possess. The subjects apparently possessed the category organ- 
ization ability to different "degrees" (p. 32).  These degrees 
of organization nay Include a subthreshold developmental 
status which must be overcome before use of the skill for a 
given memory task can occur spontaneously and be effective In 
facilitating retention.  The appearance of study behaviors 
described In preceding studies (Appel et al., 1972; Nelmark 
et al., 1971; Yussen et al., 197U) "°u" seem to represent a 
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mediatlonal deficiency In young first-grade children, since the 
behavior assumed to reflect processing activity occurred but 
was not accompanied by Increased recall.  On the other hand, 
possession of the study behavior reflecting cognitive activity 
may have been developed only to the point of needing more prac- 
tice before It could be applied effectively as an organizational 
scheme In a recall task. Other investigators have repeatedly 
demonstrated that even young children possess the ability to 
categorize material, but they fall to use this category organi- 
zational strategy for the purpose of facilitating their recall 
(Denney & Aclto, 197*1.; Denney & Zlobrowskl, 1972; Kobasigawa & 
Orr, 1973; Lange, 1973; Moely & Jeffrey, 197^; Nelmark et al., 
197D. Young children apparently practice a strategy merely 
for the sake of practicing the strategy before they are develop- 
mentally ready to utilize the strategy as a means to another 
end.  This function Is probably similar to what Placet describes 
as exercising the schemata (Glnsburg & Opper, 1969). 
Moely et al. (197^) postulated "degrees of possession" in 
children, apparently, on the basis of the observation that 
some children In the control group were able to sort the pictured 
Items more completely Into categories than others In a post- 
recall sorting task.  It does not seem reasonable that a subject 
could apply an organizational strategy to a level greater than 
his possession or knowledge of the organizational scheme.  It 
may be, however, that a child's ability to utilize an organiza- 
tional scheme is equal to or less than his level of possession 
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of the  scheme.     In other words, utilization cannot exceed pos- 
session at  any point.     In addition to degrees of possession 
Increasing with development,   degrees of utilization may need 
to be  considered  equally  developmentally dependent.     Studies 
which have measured existence of organization,   Independent  of 
Its utilization as reflected   In recall, may suggest evidence 
for developmentally related degrees of utilization.    Moely 
et al.   (1969)  found fifth graders  to have greater organization 
during their sorting of category items than was reflected   In 
their recall  scores.    Moely and Jeffrey (1974)   found similar 
results for six- and seven-year-olds. 
There  Is a possibility that at least part of the 
possession-utilization discrepancy might be an artifact which 
can be minimized by methodological  alterations   that  allow  the 
child  full  awareness   of  the  organizational  scheme.     These 
methodological approaches,  however,  may merely represent an 
induced   form of what  would   otherwise have  occurred  spontaneously. 
Conversely,   Inattentlveness   to  the  relevant  task  demands  may 
account for the apparent lack of spontaneity.     For example, 
Worden  (1974)   shows  that the discrepancy can be overcome by en- 
couraging complete possession of the appropriate organizational 
scheme during the study task.    She  Investigated recall In child- 
ren from grades  one,  three,   and five and found  that presenting 
them with an opportunity to visualize a spatial grouping of the 
Items,  as  well as providing sorting and labeling experience, 
facilitated recall and organization.     In this study,   there were 
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no differences In recall organization between spontaneous 
free recall and cued recall.  This lack of organizational dif- 
ferences between the two conditions may be attributed to 
attainment of a complete, stable organization prior to recall 
(Lange & Jackson, 19714-) I Mandler & Pearlstone, 1966; Mandler & 
Stephens, 1967). 
It Is apparent from the preceding discussion that varia- 
tions In children's awareness of task demands and the develop- 
mental availability of an organizational scheme may affect 
task performance.  In addition, the ability to apply or to 
utilize a skill that he possesses Is attenuated In young child- 
ren.  Both possession and utilization of an organizational 
scheme are apparently developmental!y dependent and appear by 
degrees.  The overlap or Interaction between degrees of posses- 
sion and degrees of utilization of an organizational scheme 
influences Its appearance In a recall task. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATION AND RECALL 
Category organization and number of Items recalled have 
repeatedly been demonstrated to increase with age (Cole et al., 
1971; Kobaslgawa & Mlddleton, 197li; Moely et al., 1969; and 
Neimark et al., 1971).  It Is clear, however, that category 
clustering does not always Increase In as linear a fashion as 
recall (Cole et al., 1^71; Denney & Zlobrowskl, 1972j Laurence, 
1966; Moely & Shapiro, 1971; Neimark et al., l°71j Rosner, 1971; 
Yussen et al., 1971;).  It has been firmly demonstrated that 
adults are able to recall more Information than children 
(Denney & Zlobrowskl, 1972; Lange & Jackson, 197U; Laurence, 
1966; Liberty & Ornsteln, 1973)-  Since Increases In adult or- 
ganization have been found to closely parallel Increases In 
adult recall In multltrlal free recall studies (Mandler & Pearl- 
stone, 1966; Tulvlng, 1962), It Is probably reasonable to pose 
a cause and effect relationship between organization and recall. 
The fact that lower levels of organization in children are 
associated with lower levels of recall tends to support the 
hypothesis, generated by adult studies, that organization and 
recall are causally related.  It has been oointed out, however, 
that certain measures of organization are apt to yield Informa- 
tion supporting the organization and recall relationship, 
whereas other measures of organization do not.  Some methods of 
measuring organization are based on the assumption that recall 
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Is dependent on organization.     Other computations  do not make 
this assumption and,   therefore, would tend to reject the cause 
and effect hypothesis between organization and recall   (Liberty & 
Ornsteln,  1973; Moely & Jeffrey, 197U).     Laurence   (1966)   con- 
cluded  that organization,  as measured by subjective organization, 
could not be held responsible for age-related   Increases   In re- 
call since subjective organization did not   Increase with age   In 
groups  of children.     If organization  Is not responsible  for  In- 
creases   In children's recall,   then something else needs   to 
assume this role.     Different types of organization schemes, 
other than the traditional category clustering and subjective 
organization, might offer some accountability for  Increases   in 
recall   In children. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEVELOPMENT  OP  ORGANIZATION 
Preferred   organizational  strategies.     A  preferred  organi- 
zational  strategy   Is  one  that   is used  by a  subject   in  a memory 
task  if several possibilities are available.     The term is  often 
used  with  the  connotation  that  only  one  strategy  is generally 
used at any given developmental level.     As  the child grows older, 
he has more organizational schemes available  to him,  since de- 
velopmentally  earlier and  later  ones  have  already been mastered. 
In any given task,   the choice  of a strategy might reflect a 
cognitive  level   that will   Insure  task  success.     Mandler and 
Pearlstone (1966)   suggest   that a preferred organizational scheme 
Is rather automatic and does not change for different stimulus 
materials.     In this study,  four groups  of free sorting adults 
were yoked with four respective groups  of adults whose task was 
to detect and use  the conceptual rules   of their partners  on a 
sorting  task.     The   sorting  task consisted  of manual placement 
of  cards   containing the  stimulus material  Into  different  piles 
according  to  a   self-imposed  criteria.     English words  were  printed 
on  cards   and  were  representative  of both high  and  low frequencies 
In  addition,   simple and  complex patterns  were  placed   on  cards 
bearing  100  small  squares.     The  simple  pattern   cards  had   two 
crosses randomly placed  on the grid,   and  the  complex pattern 
cards  had  eight   crosses  placed  at  random on  the  grid.     Subjects 
sorted both pattern and word cards.     These various  stimulus 
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arrays  did not produce differences  In speed of concept learning 
or number of categories used during the pre-recall  sorting for 
either  the subjects who were free to  Impose their own organiza- 
tion or their constrained partners who had  learned   the task. 
Mandler and  Pearlstone's  finding  that  stimulus  differences 
were not  crucial and  their conclusion that  a preferred organiza- 
tional scheme   Is automatic may apply to an adult population but 
may not necessarily hold for children.     This might be due  to the 
fact that processing all of these types  of Information,   I.e., 
words and patterns were within the developmental capabilities 
of adults.     Mandler and Stephens (1967)  expanded  this notion 
with a group of children, hypothesizing that the children would 
automatically Impose a personal organization on any array of 
stimuli.     They hypothesized that,   In order to be able to learn 
a different  target organizational scheme,   the children would 
first have to abandon  their original organizational set.     They 
predicted  that   It would take longer for constrained  subjects  to 
detect and use the organizational strategy determined by a 
group  of   subjects  who  were  free  to   Impose   their own  organization 
than   It  would  take  for those  free-sorting  subjects   to arrive  at 
their own organizational scheme.    This   Increased  time would be 
the result  of attempts to disengage the automatic  organization 
of constrained subjects.    Although their results supported 
their hypothesis   In that constrained subjects took more time 
and made more errors,  an alternative explanation  Is possible. 
A  different  point  of  view would be  to  assume  that  time and   errors, 
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Increased due to a lengthy and variable selection process from 
among several organizational possibilities.    Exercise of a 
preferred  process may not be automatic for children.    Selec- 
tion  of  one  that  will  meet  at  least minimum requirements   of 
the  task  and  falls within  developmental   capabilities  may be 
more predictive  of strategy  choice   In  children.     During  the 
sorting task,   the constrained subjects  only had  the experi- 
menter's   response  of  correct   or  Incorrect  relative   to  the  tar- 
get  organization.     Environmental   information  to  direct  the 
constrained subject toward  specific organizational content was 
essentially absent.    Constrained subjects were then forced  to 
engage  in hypothesis testing with organizational probes. 
Strategy preference may be  influenced by the stimuli being 
presented   in the experimental list.     Cole et al.   (1971 tested 
third and  sixth graders with objects,  pictures  of the objects, 
or verbal  labels of the objects   (auditorily presented).     The 
stimuli  were   judged  to  be  familiar to  the youngest  subjects   on 
the basis   of an object-naming task prior to the experimental 
condition.      Pictures  produced   the  same amount  of recall  and 
clustering   organization  as  the  actual  objects,   but   they were 
more effective  than words for  Increasing recall and  clustering 
at both age levels.     The advantageous effect of pictures  over 
words   declined  with  increasing  trials.     Responding   In writing 
produced no greater recall than verbal responding, but the former 
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produced  greater clustering  than  did  the  latter.     This  wrltten- 
verbal difference decreased over trials for the clustering 
score.     Actual  objects may have  an advantage  over  pictures   In 
children younger than subjects   In this  study (Slgel,   1971). 
A  perceptual-conceptual  continuum.     There   Is  evidence 
that  children  do  organize   In  terms  of being able  to  group  or 
classify  Information and that  their organizational schemes 
vary with age along a perceptual-conceptual continuum.    Young 
children depend more on  Information provided by the environment 
(Denney & Actio,  1972;  Slgel,  1971),  whereas older children 
and  adults  are  capable  of spontaneously generating  their  own 
conceptual  schemes   or  detecting  schemes  embedded   in  the stimu- 
lus  material   (Mandler & Stevens,   1967;  Liberty &  Ornsteln, 
1973). 
If  the   term organization   Is  limited   to  the  ability  to  de- 
tect  or   Impose  abstract  conceptual  or  classifying  schemes, 
such as   those described   In studies  of subjective organization 
and category clustering,   It would probably be concluded that 
organizational skills of young children are limited.     If, 
however,   the  term organization  Is expanded  to  Include the 
ability to detect and exploLt less abstract elements provided 
by a set  of stlmuli-whether these elements are perceptual or 
conceptual  In nature-It becomes apparent that young children 
are capable of organizing Information.     When these less ab- 
stract  schemes  are  used   In  a recall  task,   recall   Is   facilitat- 
ed  (Moely & Jeffrey,  1969).     In discussing this 
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perceptual-conceptual continuum of organization from a develop- 
mental point  of view,  several factors must be considered: 
(a)   the nature of the material to be remembered   (verbal versus 
non-verbal);   (b)   the organizational scheme from the experi- 
menter's point of view as well as from the child's;   (c)   the 
degrees of development of an organizational scheme   In terms  of 
Its  availability to the child as well as   in terms of the child's 
facility In   Its utilization;  (d)   task difficulty.     The types of 
material to be remembered as well as  the developmental status 
of  a given  organizational  scheme  will help  determine   task 
difficulty.     Other factors,   such as  decreasing  the  amount  of 
processing  time,   Increasing the  amount  of   Information   to be 
processed,  and unfamlllarlty of  Items might   Increase   task dif- 
ficulty to the point that the subject resorts to a more primi- 
tive mode of organization.    Even adults have been reported to 
abandon higher-order,  conceptual  organizational schemes   In 
favor of perceptual sallency when  task difficulty Increases. 
For example,   Mandler and  Pearlstone (1966)   used both high and 
low frequency words with adult subjects.     The subjects reverted 
to use of beginning letters as an organizational scheme for lc 
frequency words but applied conceptual organization to high 
frequency words. 
Low 
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Rote  veraus   organized recall.    There   is some evidence that 
rote recall as a memory process precedes  the use  of organiza- 
tion, both developmentally and  In  terms of responding to task 
demands.     For purposes of the present discussion, rote recall 
refers  to  the tendency of young children to recall Items   in 
the order of presentation  In a free recall situation.     Even when 
Items are presented  to children simultaneously,   young children 
tend to recall   Items corresponding to the order of spatial posi- 
tions.     The first   Item In a row of pictures  Is generally re- 
called first,   the second   Item  ln the row recalled  second,  and 
so forth.     This  tendency might be related to primitive percep- 
tual development when an  Item's spatial position   Is a more 
salient dimension for young children than a dimension Inherent 
In the   item itself.    Kobaslgawa and Mlddleton (1972)   Investigat- 
ed category clustering  In a free-recall task for kindergarten, 
third-grade and fifth-grade children.     They found   that kinder- 
garten children failed to organize the pictured  items by con- 
ceptual categories when the  Items were presented   simultaneously. 
Instead,   their order of recall reflected the order of presenta- 
tion of the  items.     Third graders appeared to be   in a transi- 
tion stage,   since some of them used category organization rather 
than serial order as a basis for their recall, but some of them 
did not. 
Lange   (1973)  also examined  the tendency for young children 
to recall simultaneously presented pictures according to the 
spatial position  of presentation.    Kindergarten children  showed 
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a marked tendency to have greater recall for the first Item 
In each row. Fifth- and ninth-grade children did not show this 
tendency.  Since young children tend to recall Items In sequen- 
tial order even during simultaneous presentation, It Is possi- 
ble that successive presentation of Items might truly bias 
recall In favor of serially ordered recall. Moely and Jeffrey 
(1971+) trained a group of six- and seven-year-olds to organlze- 
plctures by categories and compared their recall and organiza- 
tion with a control group.  Half the subjects In the training 
group and the control group received items presented simultan- 
eously.  The other half In each group received Items presented 
successively.  In both the trained and the control groups, re- 
sponses were not related to the order of presentation of the 
Items for either method of presentation. These results for 
the simultaneous presentation groups are In disagreement with 
Kobaslgawa and Mlddleton (1972) and Lange (1973). Procedural 
management of the control group In the Moely and Jeffrey (1974) 
study may account for the failure to find order effects.  While 
control subjects were being familiarized with the task, they 
received sorting experience with the Items and ultimately were 
able to view the total array since each Item was left In the 
subjects' view after It was presented. The grouping was de- 
termined by the examiner, however, which should preclude oer- 
sonal organization on the part of the subject. These conditions 
might explain the failure to find ordered recall during 
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simultaneous presentation.    Since successive presentation 
might be  expected to bias young children  toward ordered re- 
call,  failure  to  find   ordered recall   In  the  successive pre- 
sentation   condition  of  this  study might  seem surprising. 
However,  prior experience at simultaneous  viewing of the  Items, 
.iust prior to the experimental task, might also account for 
these results. 
It might be possible to test the developmental salience 
of ordered recall versus organized recall by using a repeated- 
measures design with children of different ages.     Perhaps  there 
are ages  when children might be more biased   In favor of ordered 
recall under conditions of serial presentation as  compared  to 
simultaneous presentation.    Younger children,   If they are not 
given simultaneous  viewing experience, may rely on  ordered 
recall for both simultaneous and successive presentation. 
Older children might be able to organize recall under either 
condition,   but children  In transition might produce ordered 
recall during successive presentation and organized  recall dur- 
ing  simultaneous  presentation.     The  list   order effects   found 
In the Appel et al.   (1972)  study for both simultaneous and 
successive presentation suggest that the list presented  second 
produces greater organization.    According to the successive 
presentation-ordered recall bias explanation-the order of 
the task should make no difference  In very young children  If 
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chronological age can be used as an Index of developmental 
sophistication. Under these conditions, however, it may be 
difficult to control for practice effects. 
In a multitrlal free recall task, Cole et al. (1971) ex- 
amined children's tendency to recall Items In the order that 
they were presented rather than to utilize the organizational 
scheme that was potentially available.  Children from grades 
one, three, and eight were asked to recall pictures of cate- 
gory representatives presented In blocked and random fashion. 
If items were recalled In the same order as they were pre- 
sented, no category organization would have occurred. They 
found that the correlations between Input and output orders 
for each group decreased across trials, with the differences 
between age groups were attributable to differences found In 
the first trial. Eighth graders showed a positive correla- 
tion on the first trial and a negative correlation on succeed- 
ing trials.  The negative correlation means that the last items 
in the list were recalled first after the initial trial. This 
outcome could be Interpreted as evidence for a short-term 
memory store where Items are maintained on a rote basis with- 
out the need for organization. Since organization had Its 
greatest effect on the middle Items of the list, organization 
is assumed to operate after rote recall has reached Its limit 
of efficiency. The first-trial positive correlation suggests 
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that  output  order was  determined  by  Input  order  only at  the  be- 
ginning  of  the  experimental  task.     Since measures  of  organiza- 
tion   Increased  with  trials,   It might be  assumed  that  organiza- 
tion schemes replaced ordered rote recall. 
Perceptual organization.     Perceptual organization   Is based 
on some descriptive quality Inherent  In the stimulus   Items. 
Traditionally,   the term organization refers only to more ab- 
stract dimensions  of meaning.     If this  traditional definition 
of organization is maintained,   then cognitive activity or 
classifying schemes according to perceptual dimensions are elim- 
inated,   even though they might account  for Increases   In recall 
of children at developmental levels preceding higher order or- 
ganization  schemes based  on  abstract meaning. 
The   Importance  of perceptual  organization  as   a memory 
process  should not be overlooked,   especially  In view of the 
possible developmental significance of reports  of   Idiosyncratic 
organizational schemes (Liberty & Ornsteln,  1973; Moely & 
Jeffrey,   I97U).     Slgel (1971) has reviewed his research con- 
cerning the developmental significance of certain stimulus at- 
tributes,   such as form and color.     In the review, he differen- 
tiates among the organizational criteria used by children. 
According to Slgel,  descriptive criteria depend on  the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli,  such as color,  form,  and  size. 
Relational-contextual criteria refer to the tendency for young 
children to classify Items on the basis of their functional 
characteristics.     For example,  from a relational-contextual 
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point  of  view,   spoons  are  likely to be  classified  with coffee 
cups because they are used to stir coffee.     Both criteria have 
been found to vary with sex and social class  (Slgel, 1971). 
It should be noted  that both sex and social class may also 
have developmental  Implications that are consistent with gen- 
eral developmental principles.    That   Is,   Impoverished environ- 
ments are  often assumed to contribute to less sophisticated  or 
to a slow rate of development,  and sex differences may reflect 
different rates or levels  of sophistication of development  for 
males and  females.     Relational-contextual classifying schemes 
are considered more developmentally advanced  than descriptive 
criteria and are more abstract,  since they are not bound to 
the physical characteristics of the stimuli.     Relational- 
contextual grouping,  however,   Is  considered  less  analytical 
and abstract than category clustering since  the former   Is often 
made  possible  through over-learned  associations.     Lange   (1973) 
argued that these associations may be rote  In nature and should 
not be considered representative of organization. 
Slgel  (197D Pointed out that children's  categorization 
styles vary as a function of the type of material that   they 
are classifying.    Things that are familiar to children are to 
be classified at a higher more abstract level than are things 
less familiar.     In other words,   things that are familiar to 
children are apt to be classified according to relational- 
contextual  criteria sooner than are things less familiar. 
Slgel's point   is consistent with the previous  discussion of 
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the development  of the possession-utilization gradient.    To   Il- 
lustrate,  a child may possess and be able to utilize descrip- 
tive criteria while he only possesses relational criteria  if 
familiarity of the material ranks #3 on a familiarity scale of 
1-5  (5 being the least familiar).     If familiarity ranks #2, 
he might be able to use relational criteria.     If familiarity 
ranks #kt be m&J not be able to use even descriptive criteria, 
even   though he  possesses  the ability.     Increasing familiarity 
may have the effect of decreasing task difficulty.     Decreasing 
task difficulty may allow a more developmentally sophisticated 
level of organization to operate. 
Denney and Aclto  (197k)   screened   two-  and  three-year-olds 
for their ability to classify stimuli according to similarity 
on the dimensions of color,   shape,   size,  size and shape  com- 
bined,  and color and shape combined.     Some children   In this 
young age range were able to classify geometric stimuli ac- 
cording to similarity In a spontaneous manner.     Of those who 
were not spontaneously able to classify completely a set  of 
Items,  51 children were selected for category training. 
Greater  Improvement  In classifying was found   In a training 
condition where  the  experimenter demonstrated   the  classifying 
scheme  than  In the training condition where the child was re- 
inforced for correct responses which he generated for himself. 
The significant point for the present discussion of perceptual 
classification  is  that spontaneous descriptive or perceptual 
classifying was evident   In children as young as  two and  three 
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years of age.     Earlier studies by Denney Indicated that this 
perceptual organizational ability Is present   In a majority of 
four-year-olds   (Denney, 1972a, 1972b).     In another study 
(Denney & Zlobrowskl, 1972)  to be discussed more fully later, 
organization of abstract meaning, rather than stimulus attribute, 
along a similarity dimension was not present   In fourth grade 
children but was present   In adults.     This finding of similarity 
In organization In young children and adults supports the   In- 
verse relationship between task difficulty and utilization  of 
higher level of organization.     It also supports the notion   that 
perceptual classifying (stimulus attribute)  should be considered 
a form of organization.     In other words,   If a child   Is provided 
with developmentally appropriate things to organize (e.g., 
stimulus attributes rather than abstract meaning or perceptual 
processing rather than conceptual processing) a relatively high 
level of organization  (e.g., similarity dimension)  can  take 
place, using the spoon example,   similarity organization at   the 
higher abstract level would classify It with kniyes and forks 
as   "things  to  eat with."    Slightly lower functional or comple- 
mentary classification paired spoon with coffee cup because  one 
Is used with the other. 
Using third- and fourth graders and college students, 
Bousfleld and Whltmarsh (1958)  found shifts   In modes of organ- 
ization.    They predicted that third- and fourth graders would 
process 25  Items according to the physical dimension of color 
and that  college students would classify according to taxonomlc 
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categories.     The stimuli, were pictures painted  In appropriate 
colors,   such as shoe and bear painted brown,   and boot and  dog 
tainted black.     Each picture had the name of the   Item printed 
beneath  It.     The   Items  were  presented   In  random order serially, 
and  the  subjects  were   Instructed  to  remember  the   titles.     As 
predicted,   the highest percentage of color clustering took place 
In third graders.    An unexpected finding was  that  color cluster- 
ing was lower  In the fourth graders rather than  In the adult 
subjects.     This may not seem as unexpected   If one considers 
that the   Instructions were to remember the titles.     These   In- 
structions may have   Induced fourth graders to avoid classifying 
by color.     Ad-alts,   on  the  other hand,   were  exnected   to classify 
by  titles  rather than  color,   and  the   Instructions may have 
merely  insured adult predisposition.    More  Interesting develop- 
mentally   Is   the  fact   that  third  graders   continued  to  classify 
by color—a more primitive mode—In spite of   Instructions to do 
otherwise.     Information   Is not given as  to whether the third 
graders could read  the titles,  but reading ability   Is likely 
since the   Items were simple. 
The organizational salience of auditory-perceptual character- 
istics  of verbal material was compared to the salience of 
semantic characteristics   In a study by Hasher and Clifton  (197li). 
Since the words were presented   In visual form,   there was some 
confounding of sound and orthographic characteristics, but the 
perceptual-conceptual developmental principle may still be con- 
sldered.  Cr It leal words that were phonetically related and 
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orltical  words   that  were  semantlcally related  were embedded 
in a long list  of items and presented to second and sixth 
graders.      The younger subjects apparently used   sound  as  a 
basis for organization since   it was found that  second graders 
showed greater clustering of phonetically-related words than 
of semantically-related words, regardless of whether the  items 
were presented   in random or blocked form.    On the other hand, 
sixth graders used semantic relationships as a basis of organ- 
ization  and  showed more  clustering  of the  semantically- 
related   Items.     Even   If the acoustic organization was   inter- 
preted as   orthographic-visual organization,  the perceptual 
bias  of  the  younger children  and  conceptual  orientation  of  the 
older  children  remains  the same.     It  should be noted,   however, 
that  older subjects do not always utilize semantic and   concep- 
tual  relationships.     For  example,  Nelroark et  al.   (1971)   re- 
ported   that   college  students  often resorted  to  categorizing 
picture   Items by  alphabetizing  the names.     This  apparently 
represents  the adults'   translation of the picture  Items   Into 
verbal form before application of a perceptually-oriented 
organizational strategy. 
Functional organization.    Lange and Jackson (197I4-) 
argued  that younger children make poorer approximations   to 
experimenter-defined organization,  such as   category clustering, 
and  are,   therefore, credited with clustering scores that 
underestimate their organizational abilities.     To test   this 
notion,  subjects from grades one,  four, seven,   ten,  and  college 
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were   allowed   to  sort  picture  Items until  they  produced   Identical 
sorts   twice   In succession.     Thus,   organizational stability was 
Insured prior to recall.     The Items could be classified accord- 
ing  to  either  descriptive  qualities,   functional-contextual 
relationships,   or taxonomlc categories.    Regarding descriptive 
criteria as a basis for classifying, Lange and Jackson (197U) 
are  in agreement with Slgel  (197D  and Denney and Aclto (197^) 
that descriptive criteria are primarily evident   In the very 
young,   preschool years.     The Lange  and  Jackson  subject  sample 
began  at  the  first-grade  level and  demonstrated minimal sort- 
ing on  the basis  of descriptive criteria.     College students 
sorted  according to class-Indus Ion  (I.e.,   taxonomlc  category) 
criteria to a greater extent  than  fourth graders.    The authors 
had  predicted  a  continuous  developmental   Increase  In   the use 
of class-Inclusion criteria and a  continuous decrease   In the 
use of functional criteria.     Instead,  they found an  Increase 
In functional criteria for first and fourth graders and an 
Increase   In class-inclusion criteria after the fourth grade. 
The continuous   increase  In class-Indus Ion criteria for older 
subjects was accompanied by a continuous  decrease  in function- 
al criteria.     If Slgel's  (197U criteria hierarchy holds,  the 
functional  Increase in the younger children should be accompanied 
by a continuous  decrease   in descriptive criteria.    Such Informa- 
tion was not available in this study but might be obtained by 
using younger subjects  and/or more  difficult   Items.    Younger 
subjects  should allow more descriptive criteria to appear 
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spontaneously.     More difficult   Items  should  require  older sub- 
jects   to revert   to descriptive criteria from functional criteria. 
Denney and Zlobrowskl  (1972)  favored the explanation that 
young children are capable of organization but that their organ- 
ization   Is qualitatively different from adults.    These authors 
proposed that category organization undergoes a developmental 
change from categories based on complementary relationships to 
categories based  on similarity relationships.     The term 
complementary appears,   from the  authors'   Item examples,   to be 
analogous to functional-relational relationships discussed by 
Slgel   (1971).     Similarity relationships appear analogous  to 
category classification  (Lange & Jackson,  1971*.).    First graders 
and college students were presented with two lists of stimulus 
words.      In  one  list,   the  words  were  composed  of  complementary 
pairs   (e.g.   pipe  and  tobacco);   In   the  other  list,   the  words 
were  composed  of  similarity pairs   (e.g.  king and ruler).     The 
associative frequencies of the two lists were  the same.     The 
words  of a pair were presented  In successive order.    Denney and 
Zlobrowskl reported that  children organized more than adults 
on the complementary list but that adults organized more than 
children  on the similarity list.     These results confirmed the 
hypothesis that children as young as first graders are able to 
organize material   In a recall task, but that  the basis for 
their organization  Is different from that of adults. 
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In  this   study,  adults recalled more  words  than  children 
on both the  complementary and similarity lists.     Since age- 
related differences  In clustering were found to be list 
specific but age-related recall differences were not,   the 
authors suggested that recall did not   Increase as a function 
of organization but rather as a function of associative value 
on both lists.    The associative value explanation might ac- 
count for Increases  in adult recall for both lists,   If It  Is 
assumed that adults used  the associative value as a form of 
organization.     If this   Is true,   then there   Is no explanation 
for associative organization and complementary organization 
occurring  simultaneously.     It   is  doubtful whether even  an 
adult subject  can organize Items  successfully in recall ac- 
cording  to  two  dimensions   simultaneously,  unless   one   dimen- 
sion was actively processed and the  Items colncldentally 
were  also members   of  the  other dimension   (Lange,   1973). 
Simultaneous  dimensions of organization seem even more unlikely 
for children.     The possession-utilization continuum offers an 
alternative explanation.     If the utilization of the two types 
of clustering    criteria are differentially developed   In 
adults and children,  they should be differentially effective 
in  facilitating recall.    Greater recall for adults on both 
lists would then be expected.    Since the stimuli were  verbal 
and were auditorily presented,  adults would be expected to 
possess more facility than children, regardless of the dimen- 
sion of organization  (Cole et ■!..  1971;  Hasher & Clifton, 
1971;; Nelmark et al., 1970). 
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Liberty and Ornsteln (1973)   showed evidence that func- 
tional or similarity organization does,   In fact,   develop by 
degrees.     They presented high frequency words   to fourth 
graders and adults, and found that 70f0 of the fourth graders 
sorted the words  on the basis of very distinct and well-defined 
functional relationships.     Fifty-five percent  sorted according 
to  functional   criteria  of  a less  distinct nature.     This  finding 
of  a  sequence  of  development  of  functional  criteria   Is   con- 
sistent  with  the  degrees   of possession hypothesis  proposed  by 
Moely et al.   (1969) and would explain the differential develop- 
ment  of complementary organization between children and adults 
In the Denney & Zlobrowskl study  (1972). 
Adult recall In the Denney and Zlobrowskl   (1972)   study 
might have been better on the list with similarity organization 
because similarity Is a higher order form of organization and 
is,   therefore, more efficient than  complementary organization. 
As  a result,   similarity  organization may have  a .greater  faclll- 
tatlve effect  on recall than complementary organization. 
Children,   on   the  other hand,  may not have  yet  reached   develop- 
mental  levels  which make  similarity  organization possible. 
Even   If  children attempted  to utilize similarity organization 
for recall  of  Items  from  the  similarity list,   their utiliza- 
tion  of such organization would not have reached the  same de- 
gree  of  development  as   that  of adults.     Children's  recall  of 
similarity   Items  would  only be  commensurate  with  their  de- 
gree  of utilization and would thereby produce a lower level 
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of recall  than that of adults.    Adult utilization of similarity 
organization would be developed to a higher degree and,   there- 
fore,  capable of facilitating greater recall.     Children's 
lower level of recall on the complementary list  In spite of 
high  levels  of  complementary organization  could  be  explained   If 
the nature of their complementary organization was so  lll-deflned 
or non-specific  as  to  render   It   Ineffective   In  recall  relative 
to adult recall,   even though adults  did not   organize along the 
complementary dimension. 
Conceptual  organization.     As   traditionally defined   In  the 
previous  discussion,   organization  refers  to  the  ability  to 
classify  or  group   Items  according  to  some  rule  or concept  that 
Ls not necessarily  Inherent  In the   Items themselves.     The use 
of stimulus   Items representing members of different  taxonomlc 
categories   ls an experimenter's attempt to provide a possibil- 
ity  for classification  to  the  subject.     Then,   to be   credited 
with   organization,   the  subject  merely has  to  detect   the possl- 
I blllty and utilize   It.     Since young  children  often  fare rather 
I poorly  in  this   type  of  experimenter-defined   task,   the  role  of 
I organization   In  the memory of  children   is  sometimes  unclear 
with traditional definitions of organization. 
I The preceding sections provide evidence   that  children  do 
I organize but  that their organizational  strategies are different 
I from adults'.     Prom a developmental point of view,  this con- 
I elusion should not be surprising.    Although high-order 
conceptual  organization,   such as that found   In category 
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flustering,  may be beyond  the  developmental  range  of children 
at  certain  ages,   It  Is unnecessary  to assume  that  they are 
Incapable   of organization.     However,   studies   Involving 
category  clustering provide  valuable   Information  about  the  de- 
velopmental appearance of that particular type of organization. 
For this reason,   the following studies will be reviewed from 
the standpoint of cognitive development at the conceptual level. 
Lange   (1973)   Illustrated  that   It   Is  difficult  to  construct 
a list of   Items  that contains  only conceptual categories as  a 
potential  source of organization.     In constructing a list,   the 
Investigator may also Include lower order rote associations 
that  the child has experienced with great frequency pre- 
experlmentally.     Whether or not associative affinity of  items 
is a form of conceptual organization or a form of rote recall 
probably reflects  the degree of familiarity and/or difficulty 
of the   items and   their pairing from the point of view of the 
child.     Nevertheless,  Lange  (1^73)  demonstrated   that  young child- 
ren do not  organize on the basis of conceptual taxonomlc  cate- 
gories  when  frequently associated   Items  are  eliminated  from the 
list.     Certain associative bonds may be  In  the  child's  repertoire 
and coincidentally belong to the same conceptual  category.     If 
the   Items hat and  coat  were  among a list  of   items  which  could  be 
grouped,   from the experimenter's point of view,   according to the 
conceptual categories of clothes, animals, and food; and,   If the 
child consistently recalled hat and coat together-desplte the 
fact that they had not been presented  together In the study list- 
It might be assumed that  the child was using high order 
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conceptual grouping.     The  child,   in  fact,  might  be responding 
on the basis  of an association between hat and coat,  generated 
from his life experiences. 
Lange (1973) studied kindergarten,  fifth graders,   and ninth 
graders and used picture  items representing the conceptual cate- 
(gorles  of food,   clothing, furniture,  and animals.     He attempted 
to eliminate associative bonds between words by comparing his 
items with word-association norms.     By controlling for these pos- 
sible rote associations, he found that spontaneous order con- 
ceptual organization did not appear   In kindergarten and  fifth- 
grade  children under free recall conditions.     Only ninth graders 
organized spontaneously on the basis  of conceptual categories. 
If young children possessed the ability to organize by taxonomlc 
categories but   failed  to utilize  this  skill  spontaneously  for 
the  purpose  of  assisting  their recall,   certain  organization  cues 
might   serve as   inducements  to promote   the utilization  of  the 
skill  and  produce  a corresponding   Increase   In  recall and   organi- 
zation.     Two  types  of  cued  or  Inducement  conditions  were used 
in this study to provide this evidence.     In both conditions,  sub- 
jects were asked during the study period to point to all the 
j items   that belonged to the specific  category whose name was 
called  out by the experimenter.    In other words,  as the experi- 
menter said  "animals,"  the subjects pointed  to all  instances   in 
the array that belonged to the category of animals.     This  task 
insured  that the subjects possessed the ability to categorize 
the pictures.     In one cued or Induced recall condition,   the 
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experimenter gave the subject the category label  (animals, food, 
clothing,   or furniture),  and he was to recall all the  Items be- 
longing  to  that  label  together.     The  subjects were  Informed  of 
this recall technique during the study period.     Providing sub- 
jects with category cues at the time of recall produced no 
greater recall  or organization than was found for subjects   In the 
uncued free recall condition.     Category cues at  the time of re- 
call  apparently provided   Insufficient   Inducement  for the utilisa- 
tion  of  category  organization.     However,  subjects  who  were  provided 
cues  at   the  time  of  study and  recall,   organized  and recalled  more 
at each grade level than the subjects   In the free recall condi- 
tion.     Perhaps  the relevant task orientation and category cues 
provided at  the time of study facilitated storage  of Information 
which,   In  turn,   Insured greater utilization of category organi- 
zation at recall.     This explanation would be consistent with the 
results  of Worden   (19710  concerning the stability of storage 
organization. 
Kobaslgawa   (1970)  used  pictures  from eight  categories  and 
found  recall   and   clustering  Increases   for children  from grades 
one,  three,  and  six.    These   Increases depended upon the recall 
condition which varied the amount of cuing or utilization  induce- 
ment.    All  ages showed greater recall and clustering when they 
utilized  cues at recall.     Older children were more spontaneous 
in utilizing recall cues and required less prompting to raise 
the level of recall and organization than did younger children. 
First- and  third-grade children performed no better under 
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moderate cuing conditions  than under conditions of no cuing. 
Directive cuing  (stronger  Inducement) was necessary for effec- 
tive utilization of organization   in first graders.     For sixth 
graders,   the   organization  that  occurred  spontaneously  in  the 
free recall  condition was equivalent  to that which occurred 
with moderate cuing.     For all ages, greater use of organization 
cues,   whether  spontaneous   or  Induced,   facilitated  the number of 
Items recalled.     First and  third graders'   recall was  slrllar, 
but  sixth graders'   recall  was  superior.     This  discrepancy be- 
tween  the linear development of recall and organization  Is not 
unusual   In studies   involving both category clustering and  sub- 
jective  organization (Cole et al., 1971J Denney & Zlobrowskl, 
1972;  Laurence, 1966; Nelmark et al.,  1971; Rosner,  1971; 
Yussen  et al.,  1971*).     This finding is consistent with the  Idea 
that possession of an ability and utilization of an ability 
develop at different rates  or by degrees.     Otherwise,   the ques- 
tion  is posed:     If recall   is dependent on organization, how can 
the  same  level   of  organization account  for different   levels  of 
recall? 
In  a free-recall  task,  Kobaslgawa and  Mlddleton   (1972) 
Investigated   the utilization of category organization by kinder- 
garteners,  third graders, and fifth graders.    The   Items  In this 
study were presented,  both  in blocked  form with  and without 
category labels or organization cues and  In random order with 
and  without  labels.     At   all  ages,  blocked  presentation   In  which 
the  Items  of a category were presented together,   Increased  the 
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use of category organization,   i.e.,   increased  the amount of 
clustering   in  the  subjects1   protocols.     In  the  random presenta- 
tion  condition,   fifth  graders   spontaneously used   the  category 
organization,  but   first  graders  did not;   third  graders were 
found to be   in a transition stage,   i.e.,  some used category or- 
ganization  spontaneously,   and  some  did  not. 
The que3tion  arises as  to whether clustering under condi- 
tions of blocked presentation represents   increased use of cate- 
gory organization or rote recall (Worden,  197U)»     If 1*  ls 
assumed   that   organization  takes  place  with blocked  presentation, 
then the blocking probably serves to  Increase the salience of 
the categorical nature of the   Items and serves as an utiliza- 
tion   Inducement.     A comparison of recall scores  suggests that 
organization rather than   just rote serial learning is  operating 
during blocked recall.     If organization serves  to   Improve re- 
call,   then recall should be better during blocked  presentation 
than random presentation.     Blocked presentation   increased re- 
call scors  for third graders and fifth graders but made no dif- 
ference   in  the recall of kindergarten children.     Responses   of 
kindergarten children,   in this study,  reflected  the  input order 
of the   item even during random presentation.     Providing kinder- 
garten children and third-grade children with appropriate cate- 
gory labels was not sufficient prompting either to make them 
aware  of the categorical nature of the  Items or to make them 
utilize category organization.     Category labels had a facllltory 
effect  only on   the organization of fifth graders.    In a post- 
recall  sorting  task,  all  subjects were asked to group the 
> 
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pictures   that they believed  "went  together."    Although kinder- 
garten  children   produced  reasonable  groupings,   their groupings 
did not  reflect   the taxonomlc  categories  present   In  the  list. 
In  a post-test   Interview,   when the  examiner nave  the  category 
label,   even  kindergarten  children   Identified  all  the  experi- 
mental   Items  with complete  accuracy.     This  ability to   Identify 
category members   indicates   that  they possessed  knowledge  of 
the category relationships,   even though they did not use  their 
knowledge either   In the recall task or In the spontaneous sort- 
ing task. 
Moely et al.   (1969) reported low amounts of absolute 
clustering by categories  In children from kindergarten,   first, 
and third grades.     Their recall was likewise significantly be- 
low that  of fifth graders.     Provision  of category labels was 
ineffective   inducement for utilization of category organization 
In kindergarten and first graders.     Recall and clustering  In- 
creased  only under more explicit teaching conditions.     Third 
graders were again found  to be at a transition stage,  since the 
milder   Inducement   of category labels  was  just  as  effective  at 
Increasing recall and organization as  the more explicit  teach- 
ing condition.     Spontaneous organization utilized by fifth 
graders  was  sufficient  to   Increase  recall,   and  provision  of 
either category labels or more explicit  Instructions had no 
added effect on recall. 
It  should  be noted   that  these  results  are   In  agreement 
with Lange  (1973), Kobaslgawa (197U).  and Kobaslgawa and 
Mlddleton (1972).     Eleven years  of age seems  to represent  the 
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critical age at which spontaneous category clustering as a 
form  of  organization  can account  for   Increases   In  recall,   al- 
though  there   Is  evidence  that  category  organization and  recall 
develop   In  a  stepwlse rather  than  a  linear  fashion.     To  state 
that   category  organization  accounts  for recall  by age  eleven 
does not   imply that other forms of organization cannot account 
for recall  at  younger years.     However,   their effectiveness  may 
be less.     In  short,   If  category organization   Is  associated with 
recall   Increases   In  children,   other forms  of  organization may 
also have a facllltatlve effect on recall.    Even category clus- 
tering  can  appear  spontaneously  In  kindergarten  children.     Its 
appearance at  that young age, however,   suggests  that mode of 
organization   Is  more related   to  developmental  sophistication 
than  chronological years.     When  the  kindergarten  subjects   In 
the Moely  et   al.   (1969)   study were  divided   Into  those with high 
category clustering  scores  and  those with low  clustering  scores, 
high clustering kindergarten children had greater recall.     It 
Is unclear  to what  level  recall was  facilitated  by utilization 
of category organization compared to other ages utilizing 
categorization.     This   information would  speak  to  developmental 
efficiency   In organization utilization. 
siih^.ti™  organization.     The preceding review,   outlining 
different modes  of organization that appear  In children with 
increasing  age,   has been primarily  concerned with  experimenter- 
defined organization of one type or another.    Studies   Involving 
subject-defined organization are relevant to the   Issue of 
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whether  children  are  able  to  spontaneously  Impose  their  own 
organization  on  a  set  of   Items   In  the  absence  of any obvious 
cues   Inherent   in  the   Items   themselves.     Laurence  (1966)  pat- 
terned  a  developmental  study  after Tulvlng's   (1962)   original 
subjective organization study which used adult  subjects. 
Laurence   (1966)   tested children from kindergarten, first, 
third,   and  fifth grades  as  well as  adults ranging  In  age  from 
20 to 22 years and elderly subjects ranging In age from 68 to 8I4. 
years.     Sixteen unrelated  pictures  were  successively presented 
for each  of 16 trials.    After each trial,  subjects were asked 
to recall  the   Items   In any order that   they chose.     La\irence 
found   that   the   children  did   Impose  some  subjective organization 
on  the   items.     Even  after sixteen study  trials,  however,   child- 
ren barely  reached   the  level  of  organization  that   the adult 
subjects  demonstrated on the first trial.    Furthermore,   there 
were no  differences   in the amount of subjective organization 
among any of the  children's groups, but   there were differences 
In the amount  of recall for all ages  Including the children's 
groups.      In   the  light  of age-related  recall differences  despite 
a lack of age-related differences  In organizational clustering, 
Laurence concluded that something other than subjective organi- 
zation must be accounting for the differences  In recall. 
Laurence contrasted her developmental data with Tulvlng's   (1962) 
findings which supported the hypothesis   that organization 
accounts   for   Increases   In recall. 
60 
The stepwlse development of organization  in the face of 
linear  increases   in recall may likewise be operating in the 
case of subjective organization.     Since  it may be more difficult 
for children to design  their own organizational schemes than to 
detect  and utilize  one provided  by the experimenter,   the  thresh- 
old for age-related  differences would be elevated.     In addition, 
since  the method  of  calculating  subjective  organization depends 
on  sequential  redundancy  of output   Items   In repeated  pairs, 
actual organization present may be underestimated. 
Nelson   (1969)   compared  subjective and  category  organiza- 
tion.     She presented fifteen words auditorily to five- and 
eltht-year-olds and  concluded that there were no age-related 
differences   In organization.If the organization did not depend 
on  the use  of  taxonomic  categories.     The  amount  of  subjective 
organization  of five-year-olds was equal to or greater than 
that of eight-year-olds  on an uncategorlzed  list.     This failure 
to find an   Increase  In subjective organization between ages 
five and eight years   is   In agreement with Laurence  (1966). 
In terms  of the mode  of  organization that   Is most effective 
for  recall,   the  five-year-olds   showed  better recall  by  Imposing 
their own organization on unrelated  items  than by utilizing 
taxonomic   categories,   despite  the  fact   that   the   Items  on  the 
category list had been self-generated on a task prior to the 
experimental  conditions.     The fact that five-year-olds 
generated  the  taxonomlcally-related list   In this study Is 
evidence that   they possessed the knowledge  of the categorical 
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nature of some words but could not utilize this knowledge effec- 
tively as a basis for organizing their recall.    Eight-year-olds, 
on the other hand,  found use of self-generated category organi- 
zation a more effective  organizational scheme than subjective 
organization.     It must  be  remembered,  however,   that measures  of 
subjective   organization  make no  attempt  to  define  the  qualita- 
tive nature   of  the  organization.     It   is possible  that  young 
children  detected  some associative  value among some  of  the 
Items which might represent a lower level of conceptual related- 
ness than the category relatedness which they were unable to 
use effectively. 
Cole et  al.   (1969)  presented 20 words auditorily to child- 
ren  from grades  one,  four,  six,  and nine for five trials and 
compared the recall for related lists and unrelated lists. 
They reported that very little organization occurred for either 
type of the list,  with only a slight  Increase  In recall for 
related lists.     The younger children from grades one and four 
showed little clustering until the fifth trial.     Only sixth and 
ninth graders clustered on the earlier trials.    These authors 
offered two explanations for the low level of clustering: 
a difference   In measuring  technique from that used by Tulvlng 
and Laurence,  and  too few trials.     Tulvlng (1962) noted  that 
even adults failed  to show fairly firmly established subjective 
organization prior to eight trials. 
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Liberty and Ornstein   (1973)   compared self-Lmposed 
organization  of fourth-grade and adult subjects for words 
orinted on cards.     The subjects sorted all the cards, using 
any organizational  scheme   they wished,  and   then recalled  the 
Items   In any order.     This sort-recall sequence lasted for six 
trials. 
Fourth graders found It difficult to Impose a stable organ- 
ization (two Identical sorts) within six trials. This may again 
represent limitations of studying subjective organization with 
so few trials.  The children who demonstrated self-imposed 
organization during the sorting task failed to utilize this 
organization to any great extent In their recall. In other 
words, the organization reflected in the recall protocols of 
fourth graders was not the same organization they used during 
their sorting task.  Items were grouped together In one manner 
during sorting but were regrouped differently In their recall. 
Fourth graders apparently utilized one form of organization 
for the purpose of sorting and a different form for the purpose 
of recall.  It would be Interesting to note developmentally- 
related differences In the form of organization for the two 
tasks.  If It is assumed, that utilization of an organizational 
form for the purpose of recall depends on a fairly high degree 
of development of that form, recall organization should repre- 
sent a more primitive form which has had the opportunity to be 
fully developed. Adults, on the other hand, used their sorting 
organization In their recall to a much greater degree.  Fourth 
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graders'  performances again   Indicated the ability to organize 
but an   Inability to apply a given subjective organization to 
the task of recalling the  same  Information just previously 
organized. 
Rosner (1971) used successive presentation of unrelated 
pictures to children from grades one,   five,  and nine for 12 
trials.     There was very little self-imposed  organization  In 
the free condition for first graders,  but   It   Increased  substan- 
tially for fifth graders.     First grade self-imposed organiza- 
tion was not as effective for facilitating recall   as the 
organization resulting from Instructions to "chunk" or form 
"medlatlonal"  links between  items.     Subjective organization 
was just as effective as chunking organization for ninth graders. 
In contrast to Laurence  (1966), Nelson (1969)   found  Increases 
In the amount of organization In children between grades one 
and five.     These differences between the two studies might be 
due to measuring differences,   since Laurence used Tulvlng's 
(1962) measure of subjective organization,  and Rosner (1971) 
used a clustering measure   (Bousfleld and Bousfleld, 1966).     Tn 
both cases, however,   the lists were theoretically unrelated, 
and the subjects were free to   Impose their own organization 
spontaneously. 
Prom these studies,   It appears  that children at least eight 
years of age are capable of designing and utilizing their own 
organization of unrelated   items to some extent.    However,  there 
Ls little evidence  that children are able to utilize self- 
imposed organization on a recall task before this age.    Even 
* 
fifth graders,  however,   find environmental sources of organi- 
zation,  such as   Instructions to chunk the  Items or to form 
nedlatlonal  links,  more   effective  for recall  than  the  subjec- 
tlve organization of which they are capable.     Imposing 
organization  on unrelated   Items   Is  apparently developmentally 
more difficult.     Ninth-grade subjects are able to use subjec- 
tive organization with enough facility that   It produces   juat 
a3 great an   Increase  In recall as  environmental sources of 
organization.    Ninth graders have apparently reached a level 
of developmental sophistication necessary to facilitate util- 
ization  of  self-lnposed   organization for the  purpose  of 
Increasing recall. 
i 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
Experimental  investigations  testing for the presence or 
absence of organization   in memory of children have been found 
to be a rich source of information concerning developmental 
changes   in cognitive strategies used by children.    In order to 
classify the entire developmental scope of these strategies 
used by children under the rubric  of mnemonic organization,   It 
is necessary to  deviate from traditional definitions of organi- 
zation.     This discussion dealt with the issue of whether or not 
organization  is  present   in children and  its facllltatlve effect 
on recall from the standpoint that  organization  changes along a 
perceptual-conceptual developmental continuum.     Two major ob- 
stacles for methodological and theoretical  interpretation, not 
necessarily found   In adult  studies are:     (a) children's aware- 
ness  of memory-task  demands,   and   (b)   differential  development 
of the possession  of an organizational scheme and  its utiliza- 
tion.     The first   of these  obstacles may relate to limited 
attentlonal characteristics  of young children, but there is 
also evidence that young children are not able to predict their 
own memory capabilities.     In addition,  they simply may not be 
aware that a memory task demands certain active cognitive 
strategies  to assist  their recall.     In this case children may 
Possess a cognitive strategy which would,   In fact,  assist their 
recall,   but   they  fall  to  apply  It  to   the  task because  they are 
unaware  of the nature  of the task.     The fact that c. 
iren 
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possess an ability in  the absence of facilitated recall has 
traditionally been dealt with  In the   Issue of whether or not 
children demonstrate a production deficit  or a mediation def- 
icit.    An  attempt has been made to reconcile this argument by 
use of a possession-utilization developmental continuum.     In 
addition,   this developmental continuum has been useful In at- 
tempting to reconcile apparent discrepancies  in studies  Involv- 
ing the presence  or absence of category and subjective organ- 
ization   In  children.     Since both a production and mediation 
deficit can be documented   in children's behavior,   the 
possession-utilization continuum attempts to account for their 
developmental significance. 
Subject-defined   (subjective organization)  and experimenter- 
defined   (category)   organization have been reviewed as methodo- 
logical approaches  to the study of children's memory.    It   Is 
generally  concluded   that   children  find   It  easier  to  detect  and 
utilize experimenter-defined  organization than to generate and 
Impose their own organization on unrelated   Items.    Measures of 
subjective  organization may not give a complete picture of 
what   Is being   Imposed.    Young children depend on   Information 
coming from the environment as more efficient sources  of organ- 
ization.     The ability to detect and utilize what   is being 
provided by the experimenter, however,  depends on whether the 
experimenter has  provided   something within  a given  developmental 
level  of  sophistication  of  the  child.     The assumed  cause-and- 
effect relationship between organization has been found to 
I 
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exist  Ln children,   If a developmentally appropriate dimension 
of organization Is being considered.    For example,  first 
.Traders might not be expected to categorize  items taxonom- 
ically If similarity Is  the dimension of organization under 
consideration by the experimenter.     Since functional or comple- 
mentary category organization precedes similarity from a de- 
velopmental standpoint,   first graders might be expected to 
organize categorically If functional relatedness  is the dimen- 
sion of organization under consideration by the experimenter. 
Since  information-processing models of memory deal with 
organization as a storage  or retrieval process were historically 
generated from adult research,   they fall  to account for quali- 
tative changes   in organization  In children.    For that reason 
this paper has  dealt with cognitive activity of children   in a 
memory task rather than  support for any particular model of 
memory. 
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